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II. JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by Rule 3, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals; 
III. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal by Mr. Garth Boswell, who was a defendant 
and counterclaimant in the case of John Swenson v. Garth Boswell, 
which was filed in the Eighth Circuit Court, the State of Utah, 
Utah County, Provo Department. This proceeding appeals and seeks 
to reverse the order of Judge E. Patrick McGuire, which denied 
defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment and 
reinstate the counterclaim. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the judge acted properly in granting a default 
judgment when, although defendant's counsel had withdrawn, 
plaintiff had properly notified defendant of the need to obtain 
new counsel or else represent himself, and defendant had spoken 
to the judge about the motion, but defendant did not respond to 
the motion in a legally recognizable way for over three months 
after it was made, and the motion was ruled on 19 days after it 
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was made? 
2. Whether the judge acted properly in denying a motion to 
set aside the judgment referred to above, when the motion was 
made three months after judgment was entered and there was not 
even a suggestion that any facts or circumstances had changed 
since the judgment had been entered? 
V- DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. 
Rule 2.5, Rules of Practice of the District Courts and 
Circuit Courts of the State of Utah: 
When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, 
written notice of the withdrawal must be served upon 
the client of the withdrawing attorney and upon all 
other parties not in default and a certificate of 
service must be forthwith filed with the court. An 
attorney may not withdraw without an order of the court 
where such withdrawal would result in a delay of trial. 
If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal 
served upon the client shall include a notification of 
the trial date. 
When as attorney dies or is removed or suspended or 
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an 
attorney, the party to an action for whom such attorney 
was acting, must before any further proceedings are had 
against him, be required by the adverse party, by 
written notice to appoint another attorney or to appear 
in person. 
Rule 2.8(b), Rules of Practice of the District Courts and 
Circuit Courts of the State of Utah: 
The responding party shall file and serve upon all 
parties within 10 days after service of the motion, a 
statement of answering points and authorities and 
counter-affidavits. 
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VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was initiated when John Swenson filed a complaint 
against Garth Boswell on April 1, 1986. Mr. Boswell's attorney, 
Sheldon R. Carter, filed an answer and counterclaim, but in June 
withdrew from representing Mr. Boswell. 
Pursuant to Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice of the 
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, counsel 
for plaintiff notified Mr. Boswell of the need for him to appoint 
new counsel or else appear in person. This notice, dated June 
24, 1986, also informed Mr. Boswell that plaintiff intended to 
move for dismissal of the counterclaim and for summary judgment 
if Mr. Boswell did not take some action within ten days of the 
date of the notice. 
On July 10, 1986, (sixteen days after the notice), after no 
response from Mr. Boswell, plaintiff moved for the court to 
strike the answer and counterclaim and enter default judgment in 
favor of Mr. Swenson. Notice of this motion was mailed to Mr. 
Boswell on the same day. 
Apparently as a result of receiving notice of this motion, 
on July 14, Mr. Boswell spoke to the Circuit Judge and told him 
that he intended to obtain new counsel to represent him in this 
matter. Neither Mr. Swenson nor his attorney were given notice 
of this conversation until well after it had occurred. This 
discussion was apparently Mr. Boswell's only attempt at 
responding to the motion before the court. Mr. Boswell did not 
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file an appearance of counsel or pro se or orjvide any notice to 
plaintiff's attorney. 
On July 29, (19 days after the motic * was filed), the 
Circuit Judge granted the motion to strike the answer and 
counterclaim, and on July 31 an order and judgment was entered 
in favor of Mr. Swenson. 
Three months later, on October 31, Mr. Boswell (now acting 
through Jeffrey B. Brown) moved for the court to set aside the 
order and judgment of July 31. After considering memorandums from 
both parties, the judge denied this motion on November 24 in a 
Minute Entry, with an order being entered on December 19, 1986. 
Mr. Boswell filed a Notice of Appeal on January 12, 1987, 
claiming error both in the granting of the motion to strike the 
answer and counterclaim, and in the judge's refusal to set the 
resultant order and judgment aside. 
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff notified Mr. Boswell of the need for defendant to 
obtain new counsel or else represent himself. Plaintiff notified 
Mr. Boswell of the motion pending before the court. Mr. Boswell 
took no legally recognizable action in response to the motion. 
The motion was properly granted. There was no tenable argument 
offered for setting aside the judgment and the Circuit Judge did 
not abuse his discretion in refusing to do so. 
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VIII. DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has mistakenly framed this case in terms of 
possible violations of Rule 2.5. All that this rule requires is 
that, when a partyfs counsel withdraws, opposing counsel must 
notify the party that he needs to obtain new counsel or else 
proceed on his own. No one doubts that plaintiff did just that. 
Indeed, plaintiff went beyond the minimum requirements and 
voluntarily informed Mr. Boswell of what to expect should he fail 
to take prompt action to get the litigation back on track. When 
Mr. Boswell made no apparent effort to expedite his affairs, 
plaintiff did as he said he would, and moved to strike the answer 
and counterclaim. This was not done, however, until Mr. Boswell 
had had 16 days in which to take action to appoint counsel or 
appear in person. 
T^hen a motion is pending before the court, a party wishing 
to respond to it must "file and serve upon all parties within ten 
(10) days after service of the motion, a statement of answering 
points and authorities and counter-affidavits." Rules of 
Practice, 2.8(b). There is an affirmative duty to act in a 
particular way if a person wants to have a voice in the decision. 
When Mr. Boswell spoke to the judge, he apparently believed 
he satisfied some ambiguous requirement for him to "appear in 
person", but he did not do what is required by the rule to 
validate his presumed objection to the motion before the court. 
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In fact, a careful reading of Rule 2.5 seems to indicate that the 
only consequence of appearing in person is to free opposing 
counsel to continue proceedings against him. 
The judge now had before him what amounted to a motion to 
grant default judgment. The ten day response period allowed by 
Rule 2.8(b) had expired on July 20. As pointed out appellant's 
brief, Rule 15.5 of the Rules of Practice grants power to waive 
strict compliance with the rules in order to prevent injustice, 
and that is apparently what occurred. The motion was not granted 
until Mr. Boswell had been given an additional nine days to 
respond to the motion, making it over a month since he had been 
notified of the need to obtain new counsel. 
Thus, the motion was granted not because Mr. Boswell failed 
to secure nev^ counsel within 10 days, but because he failed to 
properly respond to the motion while it was under consideration 
by the judge. To characterize the court's action as a "sanction" 
against Mr. Boswell and "abuse of its discretion" suggests a 
misunderstanding of the law. Plaintiff did not attempt to 
require Mr. Boswell to obtain new counsel within 10 days, he 
merely informed defendant of what his next move would be if 
defendant failed to do so. 
Defendant's arguments in appealing the judge's denial of his 
motion to have the order and judgment set aside are the same 
arguments made in defense of his position that the motion should 
not have been granted in the first place, and as discussed above, 
are legally indefensible. Even if the arguments had any merit, 
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the fact that the motion to set aside the judgment was not made 
until three months (to the day) after the order and judgment were 
entered suggests that, absent some compelling new developments, 
this case should not be re-opened, but the law should achieve a 
sense of finality and let the parties get on with their lives. 
It is worth noting that had defendant attempted the more 
judicially efficient path of simply appealing the default 
judgment, he would have been barred by the thirty day time limit 
of Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The only real issue in this case deals with the propriety of 
a ruling on a motion when one side has failed to respond in a 
legally recognizable way. The extreme positions a judge could 
take would be (1) put the motion on hold until the unresponsive 
party decides to take some action on it, or (2) go by the letter 
of the law and rule as soon as the ten day response time is over. 
In this case, the defendant had informed the judge that he 
was going to obtain new counsel in this matter, so the judge gave 
him extra time to do so. When defendant did not do so, the 
motion of plaintiff was granted. 
The trial court had a responsibility to protect the 
interests of both parties. To force plaintiff to wait until Mr. 
Boswell finally took action (over four months after the notice to 
obtain new counsel), would have placed plaintiff under an 
undeserved hardship. The court waited a reasonable time after 
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that required by the law, and then ruled in the only way that 
would be legally defensible* 
DATED this day of September, 1987. 
Harold D. Mitchell 
Attorney for plaintiff 
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